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Argument (logika)

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U logici i filozofiji, argument je serija izjava (u prirodnom jeziku), premisa namenjenih utvrđivanju stupnja istinitosti neke druge tvrdnje, zaključka.[1][2][3][4][5] Logički oblik argumenta na prirodnom jeziku može se predstaviti simboličkim formalnim jezikom, a nezavisno od prirodnog jezika formalno definisani „argumenti” mogu se formulisati u matematici i računarskoj nauci.

Logika je proučavanje oblika obrazloženja u argumentima i razvoj standarda i kriterijuma za procenu argumenata.[6] Dedutivni argumenti mogu biti validni ili zvučni: u validnom argumentu, pretpostavke zahtevaju zaključak, čak i ako je jedna ili više pretpostavki pogrešna, i zaključak je pogrešan; u zvučnom argumentu, istinske premise dovode do korektnog zaključka. Nasuprot tome, induktivni argumenti mogu imati različite stepene logičke jačine: što je argument jači ili ubedljiviji, veća je verovatnoća da je zaključak tačan, što je slabiji argument, manja je verovatnoća.[7] Standardi za ocenjivanje nededuktivnih argumenata mogu počivati na drugačijim ili dodatnim kriterijumima nego što je istina - na primer, uverljivosti takozvanih „tvrdnji o neophodnosti” u transcendentalnim argumentima,[8] kvalitetu hipoteza u retrodukciji, ili čak obelodanjivanju novih mogućnosti za razmišljanje i delovanje.[9]

Etimologija

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Latinski koren arguere (osvetliti, prosvetliti, predstaviti, dokazati, etc.) je iz praindoevropskog argu-yo-, a sufiksna forma je od arg- (sijati; beo).[10]

Formalni i neformalni argument

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Neformalni argumenti kako ih proučava neformalna logika, predstavljeni su običnim jezikom i namenjeni su svakodnevnom diskursu.[11] Formalni argumenti se proučavaju u formalnoj logici (istorijski nazvanoj simboličkom logikom, koja se danas češće naziva matematičkom logikom) i izražavaju se na formalnom jeziku. Neformalna logika naglašava proučavanje argumentacije; formalna logika naglašava implikaciju i zaključak. Neformalni argumenti su ponekad implicitni. Racionalna struktura — odnos zahteva, premisa, naloga, odnosa implikacije i zaključka — nije uvek naglašena i odmah vidljiva i mora biti eksplicitna analizom.

Analiza argumenata

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Cilj rudarenja argumenata je automatsko izdvajanje i identifikacija argumentativnih struktura iz teksta na prirodnom jeziku uz pomoć kompjuterskih programa.[12] Takve argumentativne strukture uključuju premisu, zaključke, šemu argumenata i odnos između glavnog i sporednog argumenta, ili glavnog i kontraargumenta unutar diskursa.[13][14]

Reference

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  1. ^ "Argument", Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy." "In everyday life, we often use the word "argument" to mean a verbal dispute or disagreement. This is not the way this word is usually used in philosophy. However, the two uses are related. Normally, when two people verbally disagree with each other, each person attempts to convince the other that his/her viewpoint is the right one. Unless he or she merely results to name calling or threats, he or she typically presents an argument for his or her position, in the sense described above. In philosophy, "arguments" are those statements a person makes in the attempt to convince someone of something, or present reasons for accepting a given conclusion."
  2. ^ Ralph H. Johnson, Manifest Rationality: A pragmatic theory of argument (New Jersey: Laurence Erlbaum, 2000), 46–49.
  3. ^ Ralph H. Johnson, Manifest Rationality: A pragmatic theory of argument (New Jersey: Laurence Erlbaum, 2000), 46.
  4. ^ The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd Ed. CUM, 1995 "Argument: a sequence of statements such that some of them (the premises) purport to give reason to accept another of them, the conclusion"
  5. ^ Stanford Enc. Phil., Classical Logic
  6. ^ "Argument", Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy."
  7. ^ "Deductive and Inductive Arguments," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  8. ^ Charles Taylor, "The Validity of Transcendental Arguments", Philosophical Arguments (Harvard, 1995), 20–33. "[Transcendental] arguments consist of a string of what one could call indispensability claims. They move from their starting points to their conclusions by showing that the condition stated in the conclusion is indispensable to the feature identified at the start… Thus we could spell out Kant's transcendental deduction in the first edition in three stages: experience must have an object, that is, be of something; for this it must be coherent; and to be coherent it must be shaped by the understanding through the categories."
  9. ^ Kompridis, Nikolas (2006). „World Disclosing Arguments?”. Critique and Disclosure. Cambridge: MIT Press. стр. 116–124. ISBN 0262277425. 
  10. ^ Harper, Douglas. „Argue”. Online Etymology Dictionary. MaoningTech. Приступљено 15. 6. 2018. 
  11. ^ Johnson, Ralph H., and Blair, J. Anthony (1987), "The Current State of Informal Logic", Informal Logic, 9(2–3), 147–151. Johnson & Blair added "... in everyday discourse" but in (2000), modified their definition, and broadened the focus now to include the sorts of argument that occurs not just in everyday discourse but also disciplined inquiry—what Weinstein (1990) calls "stylized discourse."
  12. ^ Lippi, Marco; Torroni, Paolo (2016-04-20). „Argumentation Mining: State of the Art and Emerging Trends”. ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (на језику: енглески). 16 (2): 1—25. ISSN 1533-5399. S2CID 9561587. doi:10.1145/2850417. hdl:11585/523460. 
  13. ^ „Argument Mining - IJCAI2016 Tutorial”. www.i3s.unice.fr. Архивирано из оригинала 18. 4. 2021. г. Приступљено 2021-03-09. 
  14. ^ „NLP Approaches to Computational Argumentation – ACL 2016, Berlin” (на језику: енглески). Приступљено 2021-03-09. 

Literatura

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  • Shaw, Warren Choate (1922). The Art of Debate. Allyn and Bacon. стр. 74. „argument by analogy.” 
  • Robert Audi, Epistemology, Routledge, 1998. Particularly relevant is Chapter 6, which explores the relationship between knowledge, inference and argument.
  • J. L. Austin How to Do Things With Words, Oxford University Press, 1976.
  • H. P. Grice, Logic and Conversation in The Logic of Grammar, Dickenson, 1975.
  • Vincent F. Hendricks, Thought 2 Talk: A Crash Course in Reflection and Expression, New York: Automatic Press / VIP, 2005, ISBN 87-991013-7-8
  • R. A. DeMillo, R. J. Lipton and A. J. Perlis, Social Processes and Proofs of Theorems and Programs, Communications of the ACM, Vol. 22, No. 5, 1979. A classic article on the social process of acceptance of proofs in mathematics.
  • Yu. Manin, A Course in Mathematical Logic, Springer Verlag, 1977. A mathematical view of logic. This book is different from most books on mathematical logic in that it emphasizes the mathematics of logic, as opposed to the formal structure of logic.
  • Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, Notre Dame, 1970. This classic was originally published in French in 1958.
  • Henri Poincaré, Science and Hypothesis, Dover Publications, 1952
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  • K. R. Popper Objective Knowledge; An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.
  • L. S. Stebbing, A Modern Introduction to Logic, Methuen and Co., 1948. An account of logic that covers the classic topics of logic and argument while carefully considering modern developments in logic.
  • Douglas N. Walton, Informal Logic: A Handbook for Critical Argumentation, Cambridge, 1998.
  • Walton, Douglas; Christopher Reed; Fabrizio Macagno, Argumentation Schemes, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
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  • Woods, John; Irvine, Andrew; Walton, Douglas N. (2004). Argument: Critical Thinking, Logic and the Fallacies (на језику: енглески). Toronto: Pearson/Prentice Hall. ISBN 978-0-13-039938-0. 
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  • Douglas N. Walton (2008). Informal logic: a pragmatic approach (2nd изд.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-71380-1. 
  • Trudy Govier (2009). A Practical Study of Argument (7th изд.). Cengage Learning. ISBN 978-0-495-60340-5. 

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